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Brazil: From S&T to innovation policy? 
The evolution and the challenges facing Brazilian policies for science, 
technology and innovation* 
 




High and rising levels of labor productivity are at the core of a nation’s development. The 
growth of the labor productivity of any people is a function of its ability to absorb, improve 
and create technologies. 
 
Although the importance of technological development has been recognized by the 
majority of policymakers and policy analysts, it has generally been thought of as a 
byproduct of economic development rather than as a requirement for it. 
 
For decades, Brazilians appear to have believed that technological development –a 
phenomenon linked to the emergence and multiplication of technologically dynamic 
enterprises – would arise as a natural consequence, initially of the industrialization process, 
and, more recently, of the liberalization of the economy. 
 
The science and technology (S&T) policies set in place were in principle expected to lead 
to the formation of human resources and the production of new scientific and technological 
knowledge. These policies were almost exclusively dedicated to supporting institutes of 
research and higher education. Enterprises were rarely the direct target of S&T policies and 
programs. The role reserved for the productive sector was essentially that of absorbing the 
knowledge and human resources supplied by the institutes for research and higher 
education. 
 
Since the end of the 1990s, however, Brazilians have become gradually aware of the need 
for an S&T policy directly tied to the development process of the country. The promotion 
of technological innovation has therefore become an explicit and major objective of 
Brazilian S&T policy. Nonetheless, enterprises – the key agents of the innovation process – 
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are yet to be effectively integrated into the science, technology and innovation (ST&I) 
policies, most likely due to their traditionally being considered agents external to the S&T 
system. 
 
This paper has three main objectives. The first is to delineate the evolution of Brazilian 
ST&I policy and identify its relation to the development policies and the overall 
development process of the country. The second is to search for evidence confirming the 
existence of the proclaimed shift from the traditional S&T policy towards one focused on 
innovation. Lastly, the paper outlines and analyses the main challenges that currently face 
ST&I policy in Brazil. 
 
Following this introduction, the paper is divided into two sections, with section 2 focusing 
on the evolution of Brazilian ST&I policy and section 3 on the challenges with which it 
must contend. 
 
The next section provides a panoramic analysis of the evolution not only of the explicit 
ST&I policy of the country, but also of the implicit policy present in the model of 
development followed during each of the principal historical phases of Brazilian 
development. In the analysis, special attention is given to the contribution of enterprises to 
the process of technical change and innovation. 
  
The post-World-War II period is divided into three phases. The first, extending from 
approximately 1950 to 1980, is dealt with in section 2.1, called “In search of development 
through growth.” The second, corresponding to the last two decades of the 20th century, is 
handled in section 2.2 under the title “In search of development through efficiency.” The 
last phase, which initiated around the turn of the century and is still under way, is tackled in 
section 2.3 in the form of a question: “In search of development through innovation?” 
 
Supported by the preceding effort to systematize and analyze the evolution of post-war 
ST&I policy in Brazil, section 3 surveys the main challenges faced by such policy in the 
current phase of development. It also points to the fact that the recently observed shift 
towards innovation still has a long way to go to constitute a true innovation policy. Hence, 
the most important challenge facing current ST&I policy is strengthen the transition to a 
true innovation policy, and, in turn, to transform it into an effective development policy. 
Although generating development based on technological advantage is a huge task, the 
current macroeconomic conditions of the Brazilian economy are creating a historic window 
of opportunity for this challenge to be successfully met. 
 
 
2. Evolution of ST&I and development policies 
 
Brazilian development efforts since World War II can be described as falling into three 
different phases. The first phase, which extended from roughly 1950 to 1980, can be 
characterized as one marked by the search for development through extensive growth and 
industrialization.1 
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The second phase, which approximately corresponded to the last two decades of the 20th 
century, was characterized by the search (reluctant at the outset, but progressively more 
determined) for efficiency, and ultimately development, via the liberalization of market 
forces. In this period, the dominant perception was that public policies generally hindered 
more than they helped the development process. 
 
In the present phase, initiated around the turn of the 21st century, the country is searching 
for a new development model, one that has not yet been clearly defined. Although public 
policy is again being valued as a tool necessary to development, no rupture has occurred in 
relation to the importance ascribed to market mechanisms, nor has there been any attempt 
to reinstate development policies such as those typical of the import substitution period. 
While it is not yet possible to characterize this phase with precision, it is possible to 
identify one of its outstanding traits, which is the unprecedented relevance innovation is 
coming to assume not only with reference to S&T policy, but also with regard to other 
policies, for example industrial policies, targeted at promoting development. These traits 
could be pointing to the emergence of a new phase characterized by the search for 
innovation as the pathway to development, though it should be acknowledged that this 
possibility has not yet been substantiated.  
 
In this section, the intention is not to present a detailed analysis of the ST&I policy 
measures implemented in each of the three historical phases, but rather to offer a brief yet 
panoramic overview of the main characteristics of the science, technology and innovation 
policies set in place throughout the preceding decades. The presentation will follow an 
evolutionary approach and be organized according to the restructuring of periods proposed 
in this paper. This effort to systematize Brazilian ST&I policies focuses on their ties to the 
technological development of the productive sector as well as to the overall development of 
the country. 
 
The principal features of each of the three development phases are delineated, together with 
those of the corresponding ST&I policies. This having been done, the primary impacts on 
the development process of the policies typical of each of the first two phases are outlined. 
In turn, the analysis of the current phase concludes with indications as to the trends and 








                                                                                                                                                    
War II. However, only in the early 1950s was a set of measures adopted that could be viewed as the 
emergence of a true S&T policy. The creation in 1951 of the National Research Council (CNPq) and of the 
National Campaign for the Improvement of Higher Education (CAPES) is a landmark in the early history of 
Brazilian S&T policy. Although the attributes and even the names of these institutions were subsequently 
changed, their acronyms remained the same and their importance to ST&I policy continues to the present day. 




2.1. In search of development through growth2 
 
The period 1950-1980 was characterized by import substitution industrialization (ISI). The 
State protected the infant industry, supported foreign and domestic private investment, and 
created public enterprises in sectors that were considered strategic to national development 
but failed to attract private capital. The main tenets underlying this approach were derived 
from development theories, principally from the school of economic thought elaborated by 
economists and social scientists associated with ECLAC,3 such as Raúl Prebisch and Celso 
Furtado. Industrialization was seen as a way to transfer the modern technologies, 
institutions and social relations characteristic of developed economies to developing ones.  
Development was profoundly believed to be the outcome of industrialization. 
 
Associated with this model of development was a specific process of technical change, one 
which would supposedly ensure the technological development of the country. The 
absorption and generation of technologies were perceived to be natural consequences of 
import substitution industrialization, and this can be said to have been the S&T policy 
implicit to the development model in question.4 This implicit S&T policy was constituted 
of two elements. The first, understood to be the engine of technological development, was 
the absorption – via extensive industrialization – of the capabilities required for the 
production of manufactured goods.5 The second element reflected the expectation that 
industrialization itself (i.e., the assimilation of production capabilities) would have as a 
side-effect the “industrialization” of technical change (i.e., the development of innovation 
capabilities). During this phase, most economists, policymakers and politicians shared this 
view.  
 
In the meantime, an explicit S&T policy was being designed and implemented by actors 
and interests peripheral to the import substitution model of development. This policy 
focused on fostering research and development (R&D) infrastructure and activities, in other 
words, on creating and strengthening universities and research institutes, together with 
forming the human resources required for R&D. In this way, the growing supply of 
scientific and technological knowledge and of R&D personnel was expected to be used by 
enterprises for the purpose of generating innovations. 
 
Underlying the interpretation of technical change that guided the explicit S&T policy at the 
time is the so-called Linear Model6 of innovation, according to which enterprises are 
                                                 
2 Information on and evaluations of the Brazilian ST&I policies implemented during the two first phases can 
be found in Erber (1979), Brasil (1991), Galvão (1993), Gibbons (1995), Schwartzman et al. (1995a, 1995b, 
1996a and 1996b), Guimarães (1996) and MCT / ABC (2001). 
3 ECLAC is the acronym for the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 
headquartered in Santiago, Chile. 
4 Note that the reference here is to the S&T policy implicit to the development model, and not to the concept 
more usual in the literature, which concerns the S&T policies implicit in other economic policies, such as 
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systematization in the so-called Bush Report, entitled “Science, the Endless Frontier” (Bush 1945). A rigorous 




external agents in relation to the S&T system. Consequently, the role reserved for 
enterprises is that of users or consumers of the knowledge offered by R&D institutes, even 
when said knowledge is generated without any view to the effective needs of prospective 
users.7 
 
The Linear Model assumes the existence of a more-or-less direct relationship between 
R&D efforts and technological innovation, involving a series of stages beginning with basic 
research. Basic research is therefore the key to the advance of scientific knowledge, 
opening the way to applied research, experimental development and ultimately innovation 
per se. For this reason, as research and development – and particularly basic research – 
progress, they should become the catalyst for a chain reaction leading to technological 
innovation. The model also assumes that a country that contributes to advancing knowledge 
will sooner or later reap rewards in the form of technological progress or innovation.  
 
This view of technical change served to inspire the implementation of policies aimed at 
enhancing the supply of scientific and technological knowledge. This S&T supply policy 
was essentially delinked from the industrial development policy prevalent from the 1950s 
through the 1970s. 
 
In this respect, it is important to mention that the II National Development Plan (II PND), 
implemented during the Geisel administration (1974-1979), explicitly included a national 
S&T policy as an integral part of the national development policy. However, the supply 
logic of S&T policy was not significantly altered, as Vermulm and Paula (2006, pp. 10-11) 
point out: 
 
Basically, the policy [the S&T policy of the II PND era] was strongly directed to 
research institutes and the formation of highly qualified human resources, leading 
to the substantial expansion of post-graduate courses. The assumption was that the 
low level of technological development of the country was due to a deficient 
scientific and technological infrastructure. Hence arose the priority given to 
supporting research institutes and the formation of human resources at the post-
graduate level. 
 
A final evaluation of the period indicates that the consequences of the policies adopted 
during these three decades were mixed. Import substitution industrialization was extremely 
successful insofar as it led to the establishment of a diversified and integrated industrial 
park in the country. The policy accelerated the process of economic growth to the point that 
Brazilian industrialization came to be considered an “economic miracle” in the 1970s, 
similar to that of China and India in the opening years of the 21st century. However, by the 
end of the 1970s, the economic growth of the country start to lose dynamism due to waning 
opportunities for import substitution, a process of technology absorption essentially 
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dependent on the expansion of import substitution and the unfavorable international 
environment of the day. 
 
The growth leveraged by industrialization led the first element of the S&T policy implicit 
in the development model (i.e., the absorption of the capabilities required for the production 
of manufactured goods) to a successful outcome. However, the second element (i.e., the 
“industrialization” of technical change) was essentially a failure. This element was shown 
to be based merely on unrealistic expectations as to the capacity of industrial enterprises to 
develop capabilities for generating technology improvements and innovations out of their 
recently acquired production capabilities. Likewise, the S&T policy explicitly aimed at 
increasing the supply of knowledge (albeit delinked from the needs of industry) also 
appears to have contributed little towards enhancing the enterprises’ capabilities for 
technological improvement and innovation. In fact, since the productive sector rarely took 
advantage of the supply of knowledge made available through implementation of the 
policy, the supply could be said not to have found its demand. The technological dynamism 
of the country therefore continued to depend primarily on the absorption of technologies 
generated and/or improved abroad. At the same time, the usual reasons for such absorption 
– the emergence of new economic sectors or the growth of the domestic market – were 
losing strength. 
 
In time, developing technological capabilities for the improvement and innovation of 
products and processes would become essential for raising the low productivity and 
competitiveness levels of the Brazilian economy. However, raising these levels would 
depend on sustaining the economy growth once the import substitution process had been 
exhausted, be it through broadening the domestic market, raising income via productivity 
gains or conquering new foreign markets. 
 
Although economic growth was exceptionally strong during all three decades, economic 
development proved to be elusive. Once the sources of this growth had been depleted, they 
had not yet been adequately complemented or replaced by endogenous technological 
development, while the capacity to absorb exogenous technologies was still limited. 
Furthermore, the levels of poverty and inequality remained extremely high and far from 
compatible with the standards typical of developed economies. The first phase therefore 
ended in the midst of macroeconomic and fiscal crises, which, among other problems, 
severely compromised the capacity of the State to implement development and S&T 
policies adapted to the new structural conditions of the Brazilian economy.  
 
 
2.2. In search of development through efficiency 
 
In Brazil, the second postwar development phase, a period that roughly corresponded to the 
last two decades of the 20th century, was marked by progressive liberalization of the 
economy. Initially with reluctance, but eventually with determination (especially as of 1990 
during the Collor administration), the institutional and regulatory apparatus created over the 
previous decades in support of industrialization was gradually dismantled. Simultaneously, 
the general opinion of economists, politicians and opinion makers turned against policy 
prescriptions based on the development theories of the previous period. In fact, the very 




industrialization policies founded on these theories came to be blamed for the high levels of 
inefficiency and the persistent economic and technological backwardness of the country, in 
other words, for its lack of development.  
 
The search for efficiency came to be one of the priorities of economic policy. Despite the 
concept of efficiency having been defined (according to the traditional economic theory 
that gives support to liberalization) within an essentially static context, where there is no 
room for technological change, the search for efficiency was presented as one of the 
principal engines of technological progress. The order of the political day came to be terms 
such as privatization, deregulation, the reduction or removal of subsidies and tariff or non-
tariff barriers to foreign trade, free exchange rates and free capital flows – as the measures 
inspired by the Washington Consensus, the set of economic reforms recommended for 
developing countries as of the early 1980s came to be called, all with the support of the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the 
North-American government and the leading economic research institutes (“think tanks”) 
located in the city.8 
 
The opening of the economy to international trade came to be considered the key to growth 
and development, thus ascribing to liberalization the role formerly played by 
industrialization in underdeveloped economies. According to this conviction, the more open 
the economy, the greater it’s potential for growth. 
 
The opening of the domestic market to products, services and capital from abroad was also 
tacitly understood to be the principal instrument for the implicit S&T policy linked to the 
new development model.9 The increased competitive pressure arising from liberalization 
was expected to eliminate the protection that allowed enterprises that employed stagnant or 
antiquated technologies to profit, thus forcing them to innovate. At the same time, the 
opening of the market was also expected to facilitate and accelerate technological transfers 
from abroad via foreign direct investment (FDI). 
 
To an extent, the explicit S&T policy of the era upheld the tradition of promoting R&D 
activities. However, the prolonged fiscal crisis and the short-term approach to the 
administration of public policies led to significant fluctuations with respect to the support 
offered R&D activities and institutions in the 1980s and 1990s. During the 1990s, for 
instance, federal investments in R&D rose until the middle of the decade, then fell to levels 
only slightly above those at the beginning of the period (MCT 2001, p.23). As a result, 
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by means of its effects on the technological dynamism of the country, what will define the basis of the new 
cycle of growth.” He also states the importance of the opening of the economy as “essential to the accelerated 
growth of productivity, and therefore the mechanism that would allow for... the construction of a growth 
model capable of reducing social inequality without inflationary impacts.” (Franco 1996, p. 2) 




many learning and research institutes faced budget problems, wage cutbacks and reductions 
in the number of professors, researchers and technical staff.10  
 
Despite these difficulties, the other traditional area guided by S&T policy – the formation 
of human resources for research and development – surprisingly advanced in systematic 
and accelerated fashion. Hence, the Brazilian post-graduate system rapidly expanded and 
consolidated during this period.  
 
In addition to the two traditional aspects of S&T policy, five new aspects either emerged or 
gained significance during these years. 
 
The first of these refers to the greater importance ascribed, at least with respect to concern 
or the political discourse, to the issue of the quality and expansion of the educational 
system, and especially of basic education. Attention was called to the fact that a well-
educated workforce was prerequisite to raising the technological capabilities of Brazilian 
enterprises. All too often, however, the theme was approached in an overly simplistic 
manner, as if education alone were sufficient for development, or a universal panacea 
capable of replacing all other policies (including those directed to S&T).  
 
The second new aspect has to do with the reform of the intellectual property regime (IP) in 
order to satisfy the regulations of the TRIPS Agreement of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and attend to the strong pressures from the North-American government.11 Long 
before the creation of the WTO (1995) and the approval of the new patent law (1996), the 
reform had already begun with measures that hindered the National Industrial Property 
Institute (INPI) in its attempts to apply the earlier regime, and especially the provisions 
aimed at granting Brazilian enterprises stronger bargaining power or facilitating 
technological transfers.12 The intention of the reform was to transform scientific and 
technological knowledge from an essentially public good (which allows it to be 
simultaneously employed by various users) into an essentially economic good (which the 
concession of farther reaching and longer lasting monopolistic rights of exploitation to 
proprietors). There was thus an evident shift to the advantage of the innovators, which were 
usually foreign enterprises, and to the disadvantage of those that absorbed the new 
technologies, which were generally domestic enterprises. The goal of the new regime was 
to stimulate innovation among the enterprises established in the country, regardless of their 
origin of capital. It was also meant to increase the number and enhance the quality of the 
technologies and trademarks for which licenses to operate in the Brazilian market were 
granted, these objectives to be met thanks to a new regulatory environment that offered 
more guarantees, further rights and, consequently, higher profits to those who held the 
licenses. 
 
                                                 
10 In great part, these reductions were due to many retiring when faced by the prospect of prejudicial social 
security reforms, as well as their not being replaced by new personnel. 
11 The IP reform was consolidated via enactment of laws pertaining to industrial property (Law n° 9.279 of 
1996), agricultural variety  rights (Law n° 9.456 of 1997), copyrights (Law n° 9.610 of 1998) and software 
rights (Law nº 9.609 of 1998). 
12 This occurred owing to the regulatory acts of INPI itself, namely the revocation of Regulatory Act n° 15 of 
1995, promulgated via Regulatory Act nº 22 in 1990, and the promulgation of Regulatory Act n° 120 in 1993. 




The third new aspect of S&T policy was the initiation and consolidation of the accelerated 
dissemination of quality control practices, stimulated by the creation of the Brazilian 
Quality and Productivity Program (PBQP) in 1990.13 Termed a mobilization program at the 
time, it was designed to encourage enterprises to adopt best practices, even in the absence 
of funds specifically earmarked for the purpose. In fact, however, it is more likely that the 
spread of such practices reflected less the efforts of the PBQP than the pressures to which 
Brazilian enterprises were being submitted. Faced by a macroeconomic environment in 
which demand was stagnant, credit extremely scarce and competitive pressure on the rise, 
many enterprises had recourse to defensive strategies, among which quality management 
was often considered the best option; for it was seen as a way to bolster competitiveness 
and cut costs without the need for new investments. 
 
The dynamism of the spread of best management practices can be inferred from the 
enormous growth in the number of public and private entities that have come to operate 
with the ISO 9000 certification granted by the International Organization for 
Standardization. Whereas only 19 Brazilian institutions were ISO certified in January 1993, 
the figure had risen to 6,719 by 31 December 2000. Moreover, the number of certified 
institutions has risen 25 times faster in Brazil than in the world as a whole (ISO 2001). It is 
important to note, however, that advances in the quality of Brazilian production cannot be 
expected to leverage and thus accelerate innovation. What these advances have most likely 
achieved is to have strengthened the production capabilities of enterprises, thereby better 
enabling them to improve products and process and engage in incremental innovation. 
 
The fourth new aspect of explicit S&T policy concerned the stimulation of entrepreneurship 
and the establishment of incubators and technological parks. Although many of these 
incubators and complexes merely encouraged the creation of small firms in traditional 
sectors and contributed only marginally to raising the existing technological standards, a 
fair number of these institutions were dedicated to promoting truly innovative undertakings. 
Most of the public programs and measures aimed at fostering incubators and technological 
complexes initially arose in the late 1980s and gained strength over the following decade. 
According to the estimates of the National Association for the Promotion of Innovative 
Activities, the number of incubators in Brazil climbed from only two in 1988 to 150 in 
2000 and 359 in 2006 (Anprotec 2006). In the same year, Anprotec identified the existence 
of 44 technological parks in the country. 
 
The fifth unprecedented aspect was to treat innovation as a policy objective. It was possible 
for innovation to overcome the barriers imposed by the liberals in the debate surrounding 
public policy because it could not be associated with the by then execrated former 
development policies, and could actually be seen to approach the ideas of free initiative and 
entrepreneurship, both of which are concepts dear to liberalism. In this regard, the liberals 
accepted bringing innovation into the discussion because they understood it to be a more or 
less natural outcome of the suitable rewards and punishments accompanying the 
liberalization of the market. However, as time passed and frustration grew in relation to the 
high expectations associated with liberalization, innovation gained strength as a goal to be 
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actively pursued by public policy. As a result, innovation became increasingly significant 
not only in the S&T sphere per se, but in regional, state and municipal development policy 
as well. By the end of the 1990s, innovation was already held to be an integral part of 
science and technology policies, or at least one of its explicit objectives. 
 
Nonetheless, bringing innovation into the political discussion proved far easier than putting 
it into political practice, for the Linear Model still had strong influence, especially in 
academic circles. In part, this had to do with the enormous influence that the academic 
community wielded (and continues to wield) in the formulation of Brazilian S&T policy. It 
is important to note that the extent of this influence is partly owing to the limited 
participation of other social sectors, and specifically members of the productive sector, in 
S&T policymaking. Another reason for the persistence of the Linear Model is related to its 
long tradition and the familiarity of individuals and institutions (including regulatory 
entities) with the programs and mechanisms typical of the linear supply model. At the same 
time, actual policymaking have shown important difficulties in the process of designing and 
implementing programs and mechanisms better suited to a genuine innovation policy.14 
 
In this respect, Pacheco (2007, p. 9) contends that: 
 
Examination of the policies reveals that the success of post-graduate courses, 
compared to the dismal performance of the private sector, reinforced the ‘supply’ 
side of the policy and the asymmetry of the system. The consolidation of post-
graduate courses reflected a tremendous effort to qualify personnel and fortify 
academic research; and while it should have been accompanied by the 
technological strengthening of enterprises, this had always been the weak side of 
the model. Thus, instead of leading to revision of the policy, it reinforced the 
‘academic’ side and came to lean in two directions: the success of the post-
graduate system created strong pressure on the allocation of public funds, while the 
policies and measures aimed at supporting R&D at the firm level came to be 
thought of in the same terms as those directed to supporting academic research, 
rather than being seen as belonging to the sphere of economic policy. 
 
Final assessment of the period indicates that the policies adopted in the 1980s and 1990s 
were considerably less successful than anticipated. Although highly qualified human 
resources – with Master’s degrees and PhDs – were formed and scientific production 
                                                 
14 That the traditional economists (those belonging to the neoclassical school) prevailed in the debate 
concerning public policy also contributed to extending the life of the Linear Model. For these economists, the 
only justification for the existence of public policies was the need to correct market failures, a typical case 
being that involving the production of scientific and technological knowledge, principally in the stage of basic 
research. Since a great part of the results of the investments in such activities would ultimately be 
appropriated by parties other than those who paid for them, State intervention would be required in order to 
raise the volume of R&D investments to levels compatible with the maximization of efficiency and social 
well-being. By definition, this market failure is specifically linked to research that has no immediate use or 
application as its objective, i.e., to basic research. Obviously, the same logic does not apply to policies 
directly targeted at stimulating innovation. For this reason, the latter are held to destabilize the maximum 
efficiency and well-being equilibria, which are assumed to be naturally maintained by market forces. 




expanded at elevated rates, technological development and innovation did not keep pace, 
apparently having registered less-than-significant evolution. 
 
In 1987, for example, 3,647 Master’s degrees and 868 PhDs were granted by Brazilian 
institutions, but by the end of the phase, in the year 2000, the corresponding figures had 
risen to 18,373 Master’s degrees and 5,335 doctorates (CAPES 2004, p. 29-30). This 
increase in post-graduate degrees was accompanied by a similar increase in the number of 
articles published by Brazilians in international scientific journals. Whereas in 1981 
Brazilians had authored only 1,891 articles, corresponding to 0.44% of the total indexed 
worldwide by the Institute for Scientific Information (ISI), by 2000 they were producing 
400% more, with 9,591 articles and 1.33% of the total.15 
 
Though a longer period of time may be required to adequately appraise them, the changes 
in the industrial property regime do not appear to have the expected results within the initial 
timeframe. Between 1990 and 2000, the number of patents granted to Brazilian residents 
rose a mere 30%, while the number granted to non-residents increased by 154%. 
Consequently, the relative share of patents granted to Brazilians (already low at 30%) fell 
to 18% over a 10-year period (INPI/MCT 2007). During the 1990s, over 100 thousand 
patents for inventions were registered by non-residents. The right to use this increased and 
huge number of  patented inventions obviously depended on the concession of licenses by 
their owners, interestingly though the number of license applications submitted to INPI 
dropped from an already extremely low 134 in 1990 to no more than 34 in 2000 (INPI 
2008).16 If this number can be taken as an indicator of the magnitude of technological 
transfers to the country, the new intellectual property regime can be said to have had results 
contrary to expectations. 
 
The average productivity of Brazilian labor (measured as GDP at constant purchasing 
power parity prices divided by the number of workers employed) stagnated throughout the 
1980s and 1990s (Viotti 2004). In spite of the overall average having remained basically 
constant, certain sectors of the economy recorded positive productivity gains. There are 
indications, however, that the greater part of the rise in productivity in these sectors was 
due more to the acquisition of capital goods and changes in sectoral composition than to 
innovation and technological change per se. As Kupfer and Rocha (2005, p. 75) emphasize,  
“the modernization [of industry] was based not on sustainable long-term strategies – such 
as the installation of new production units – but on the renewal of equipment – via the 
importation of capital goods – and the restructuring of ownership through mergers and 
acquisitions.” The productivity gains observed in the industrial sector therefore reflected a 
concentration of output among the leading enterprises (which had relatively high 
productivity and were increasingly under the control of foreign capital), a rise in the 
coefficient for imported inputs and components, and a drop in the significance of industrial 
                                                 
15 In 2007, Brazilians published 19,428 scientific articles, corresponding to 2.02% of total world production. 
Whereas worldwide scientific production doubled over the period 1981-2006, Brazilian output increased 
ninefold (CAPES 2008).  
16 Article 62 of the Industrial Property Law (Law nº 9.279 of 1996) requires that third parties be licensed by 
INPI. However, it does not require that the right to exploit patents be licensed by the Institute, unless the party 
concerned wishes to claim tax deductions referring to the payment of patent licenses, in which case 
registration is necessary.    




employment. In compensation, informal employment increased substantially in the 
economy as a whole. 
 
The structure of Brazilian foreign trade changed significantly during the opening of the 
economy. However, aside from the exceptional performance of Embraer (an aircraft 
manufacturer founded and developed by the State but under private control at the time), the 
technological content of Brazilian exports was generally impoverished. In fact, the trend 
was towards regressive specialization of the export content, insofar as the shares of natural-
resource and labor-intensive goods once again increased. Regarding this point, Viotti and 
Macedo (2003, p. xxxiv) confirmed (on the basis of Sarti and Sabbatini 2003, p. 400) that 
“the product group that contributed most to the overall growth of Brazilian exports [in the 
period 1989-2001] was comprised of primary commodities, among which meat, sugar and 
soybean oil stood out, accounting for 24% of the total increase in Brazilian exports.”17 The 
fact that these three products were responsible for only 0.5% of the growth of world exports 
over the same period serves to underline the limitations of a growth strategy based on 
primary commodities. 
 
In sum, the economy was liberalized, but its growth was mediocre up to the end of the 
period. Not even the strong increase in competitive pressure, the opening of the economy to 
foreign investment and the strengthening of intellectual property rights had the capacity to 
effectively stimulate the development of a true innovation dynamic among Brazilian 
enterprises. In other words, the implicit S&T policy linked to the search for development 
through efficiency is apparently grounded on an overly simplistic as well as overly 
optimistic interpretation of the process of technical change, being similar in this respect to 
the policy underlying the industrialization model. 
 
Moreover, with the economy slowing down and poverty and inequality remaining at 
unacceptably high levels, disillusion with the promises of the Washington Consensus was 
on the rise. This disillusion was among the factors that contributed to the election, at the 
end of 2002, of an administration that offered a platform considerably different from the 
agenda set forth by the Washington Consensus. The new platform proposed another type of 
development, one less concerned with competition and efficiency and more strongly 
committed to social inclusion. 
 
 
2.3. In search of development through innovation?18 
 
The third postwar development phase began around the outset of the 21st century and has 
been marked by the search for a new type of development. In great part, the foundations 
that had inspired the policies typical of the agenda in the preceding phase were maintained, 
                                                 
17 It should be emphasized that the success of these agricultural exports was in great part due to the R&D 
efforts of Embrapa. A network of agricultural institutes founded by the federal government in the latter part 
of the 1970s, Embrapa has consolidated its position over the last three decades and merits analysis apart. 
18 For a discussion of recent Brazilian ST&I policy, see Arruda, Vermulm and Hollanda (2006), particularly 
the chapter on the new instruments of technological policy on p. 82-114. Also see MCT (2002), Brasil (2003), 
Guimarães (2006), ABDI (2006 and 2007), Salerno and Daher (2006), Vermulm and Paula (2006), MCT 
(2006), Suzigan and Furtado (2006), Pacheco (2005 and 2007) and MCT (2007).   




with the trio “floating exchange rate, inflation target and primary surplus” continuing to lie 
at the core of economic policy. However, experiments came to be conducted in an attempt 
to strengthen certain public policies not precisely aligned with the former agenda. 
 
The diminishing belief in the liberal platform has allowed for gradual  revalorization of the 
role of active public policies as a tool necessary for the promotion of development.19 It 
must be recognized, nonetheless, that the extent to which such policies can be formulated 
and implemented has been considerably reduced by the current mobility of capital, goods 
and services (characteristic of globalization), as well as by the regulations of the WTO, 
which went into effect together with its creation in 1995. Given the new environment, many 
former policy practices have become either obsolete or unfeasible. 
 
At the same time, the significant strengthening of social and compensatory policies as of 
the beginning of the new phase clearly reflects a revalorization of the role of public policy. 
An outstanding example is the Bolsa Família program, which in 2008 guaranteed a 
minimum income to more than 40 million Brazilians below the poverty line. 
 
The search for a new development model still lacks a clearly defined policy paradigm. 
Instead, it continues to be influenced by essentially mixed and sometimes divergent 
approaches. Some characterize it as a a combination of a conservative approach to 
economic policy together with a progressive approach to social policy.20  
 
In a context marked by the lack of a unifying logic, it is not yet possible to discern the 
emergence of an implicit S&T policy with well-defined features within the new 
development model. However, continuing to follow a conservative monetary policy 
(exclusively committed to achieving inflation targets with no concern for variations in 
investment, employment and income levels) has unquestionably had a strong indirect 
impact on the technological development dynamic of enterprises. 
 
Measured in real terms, the basic interest rate of the Brazilian economy remained at 
extremely high levels throughout the first years of the 21st century, being the highest in the 
world during a great part of the period. Simultaneously, the exchange rate, influenced by 
various factors, including monetary policy itself, was initially devalued (up to 2003), but 
rapidly revalued thereafter. This combination of high interest rates and overvaluation of the 
national currency has hindered productive investment in general, and especially investment 
in activities with long-range returns, such as R&D and innovation. Enterprises and links in 
                                                 
19 In this respect, one should remember, as do Lall and Teubal (1998) in their interesting and instructive 
analysis/proposal for technological policies in developing countries, that active policies are not necessarily 
State attempts to substitute the market. In other words, despite what certain critics claim, they are not anti-
market policies. As a rule, they are actually market-stimulating policies, as shown by the experience of the 
East Asian countries analyzed by Lall and Teubal. 
20 This interpretation was used, for instance, by Michael Reid, editor of the Americas section of The 
Economist, in his article “Ya es mañana en Brasil,” published in the Madrid newspaper El País on June 19, 
2008 (http:// www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/manana/Brasil/elpepiopi/20080619elpepiopi_12/Tes). In 
support of his assessment, Reid cites the President himself: “During a press conference promoted by The 
Economist in Brasília… Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva addressed a well-phrased, good-humored speech, in which 
he transmitted a simple message, to an audience of businessmen. He said that his political formula relied on 
being ‘conservative in economic matters’ and ‘audacious in social matters’.” 




productive chains dedicated to activities with high value added have been particularly 
affected. In contrast, enterprises that operate in sectors intensive in natural resources 
(specifically commodities sectors) and whose competitive strategies have little dependence 
on investment in R&D and innovation have been relatively favored. 
 
However, in contradiction to the S&T policy implicit in the previous development model, 
awareness has been growing as to naivety of the belief that opening the economy, 
strengthening intellectual property and encouraging foreign investment would 
automatically lead to extensive firm-level innovation.21 As a result of this awareness, the 
adoption of active policies to stimulate innovation has assumed growing importance in the 
economic, industrial and S&T policy debate. In this regard, explicit S&T policy, similar to 
social policy, has become a fertile field for policy experiments. An important and complex 
set of S&T policy measures was instituted at the start of the most recent development 
phase. Among these, the following stand out: the Sectoral Funds, the Law of Innovation, 
the Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade Policy (PITCE), and a law granting fiscal 
incentives to firms that engage in R&D and technological innovation (Lei do Bem).  
 
The Sectoral Funds in Support of Scientific and Technological Development were 
established during the final years of the Cardoso administration. The intention was to assure 
the availability and growth of resources for scientific and technological development and 
innovation in Brazil. The funds are financed by shares of the royalties on the oil and gas 
produced in the country and contributions levied on the revenues of enterprises in given 
sectors or on certain types of transactions, such as those referring to payment for the use or 
acquisition of foreign technology. There are currently 16 sectoral funds, 14 referring to 
individual sectors and two involving more than one sector (MCT 2008).22 
 
In the opinion of Arruda, Vermulm and Hollanda (2006, p. 102): 
The resources provided by the revenues earmarked for the sectoral funds were 
indeed significant and halted the declining trend observed in the MCT [Ministry of 
Science and Technology] budget throughout most of the 1990s. Between 1999 and 
2005, the budget handled by the Ministry rose from [R$] 1.397 billion to [R$] 3.589 
billion, corresponding to a real growth of approximately 27% over the period and 
an average annual growth rate of 4.5%. The sectoral funds accounted for almost 
80% of this growth. 
 
Inspired by the North-American Bayh-Dole Act and the French innovation law, both aimed 
at stimulating the contribution of public university and research institutes to the innovation 
process, the Brazilian Law of Innovation23 was enacted during the first term of President 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The law regulates the transfer to private enterprises of the 
                                                 
21 It should be noted in passing that, as previously mentioned, the first phase of postwar Brazilian 
development was also marked by a certain naivety. During the import substitution period, it was believed that 
technological development would be the natural outcome of the mere absorption of the capacity to produce 
manufactured goods, i.e., would be a byproduct of industrialization. 
22 Of the latter, one of the funds is aimed at stimulating university-industry collaboration, while the other is 
directed towards modernizing and expanding the infrastructure and services required by public learning and 
research institutions. 
23 Law n° 10.973 of 02/12/2004. 




technologies generated by public institutions, as well as allowing the latter to share their 
infrastructure, equipment and human resources with the former.24 It also authorizes the 
federal government to hold minority shares in the capital of private enterprises constituted 
as specific purposes companies on the condition that the latter are dedicated to innovation. 
Likewise, the law allows the government to subsidize enterprises by granting them 
financial resources for the purpose of developing innovative products and/or processes. 
Finally, it authorizes public administrators to solicit the development of technological 
solutions when innovative products or processes are required to attend to the public interest. 
 
Other legislation, curiously termed the Good Law (Lei do Bem),25 consolidated and 
amplified existing fiscal incentives, as well as extending substantial new incentives, to 
enterprises that engage in R&D and technological innovation. In addition, the law 
authorizes the federal government to grant subsidies to firms that contract researchers with 
Master’s or doctoral degrees for the purpose of undertaking R&D and technological 
innovation activities. 
 
The bases of the new Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade Policy were laid through 
publication of the guidelines at the end of 2003 (Brasil 2003). According to these 
guidelines, the goals of PITCE were to “increase the efficiency of the productive structure, 
enhance the innovative capacity of Brazilian enterprises and expand exports” (Brasil 2003, 
p. 2). Arruda, Vermulm and Hollanda (2006, p. 83-84) have called attention to the fact that 
the document seeks “to differentiate PITCE from the industrial policies of the 60s and 70s, 
which focused on expanding the physical capacity of the industrial complex, as well as 
from the policies of the 90s, which sought to promote competitiveness but were not directly 
tied to any industrial development policy.” 
 
Both complex and ambitious, PITCE set priorities on three fronts: 1) innovation and 
technological development, modernization of the industrial sector and improvement of the 
institutional environment; 2) enhancement of production capacity/scale and strategic 
options (semiconductors, software, capital goods, pharmaceutical and medical products); 
and 3) future bearer sectors (biotechnology, nanotechnology, biomass and renewable 
energy). Moreover, numerous institutional and regulatory measures, programs, activities 
and credit lines were created, reoriented and implemented by several governmental 
institutions within the loose umbrella of PITCE.26 As hard as it has often been to achieve 
the objectives of PITCE in the face of numerous obstacles and limitations, and despite its 
priorities having been considerably redefined recently,27 the policy has recorded at least 
                                                 
24 In this respect, the Law of Innovation reflects high expectations in relation to the role of public universities 
and research institutes in the innovation process. At times, certain enthusiasts of the law seem to exaggerate 
the potential contribution of these institutions by portraying them as as capable of offsetting the limited 
number of truly innovative firms in the country. 
25 Law n° 11.196 of 21/11/2005. 
26 Salerno and Daher (2006) present a long list of the measures implemented by PITCE since the publication 
of its guidelines in November 2003 until June 2006. 
27 When this paper was written, a new industrial policy was on the verge of being announced. Unfortunately, 
given the timing, it was impossible to analyze the new policy in the context of this study. The same applies to 
a key document published at the end of 2007: the MCT Plan of Action for 2007-2010: Science, Technology 
and Innovation for National Development. 




two significant victories. Firstly, PITCE resuscitated industrial policy, which had been 
abandoned during the preceding development phase. Secondly, it represented the first 
explicit attempt – in Brazil – to align industrial and technological policy. 
 
In addition to these four initiatives, the most significant of the explicit S&T policy of the 
period (the Sectoral Funds, Law of Innovation, “Good Law” and PITCE), four recent trends 
that deserve mention are: 1) the growth of media interest in ST&I issues; 2) the increase in 
the number of states and municipalities striving to formulate their own ST&I policies; 3) 
the effort to design an ST&I policy aimed at promoting social inclusion; and 4) the 
adoption of Local Productive Arrangements (LPAs) as a tool for guiding analyses and 
interventions aimed at stimulating localized innovation, technological and productive 
development. 
 
While not easy to measure, it is easy to perceive the growing interest of the Brazilian media 
in themes related to science, technology and innovation. At the same time, the level of this 
interest is still relatively limited compared to that in countries engaged in accelerated 
catching-up processes, such as South Korea. 
 
The Federal District, the states and an increasing number of municipalities are also 
becoming increasingly interested in the theme. Various states have set up secretariats and 
many have programs and policies exclusively dedicated to ST&I. The phenomenon gained 
impetus with the Constitution of 1988, which authorized states to support such activities by 
earmarking state tax funds for the purpose, a pioneer experience along these lines being the 
Research Support Foundation of the State of São Paulo (FAPESP). However, the most 
recent evidence of the trend is the appearance of interest on the part of cities. Similar to the 
states, various municipalities have come to view innovation as a way to promote regional 
and local development. This involvement of states and municipalities in ST&I policy is 
now being formalized in the shape of national institutions for the sake of sharing 
experiences and defending common interests. Among these institutions are the National 
Council of State ST&I Secretariats (http://www.consecti.org.br) and the National Forum of 
Municipal Science and Technology Secretariats (http://www.forum-municipal.org.br).  
 
A new specific segment of the ST&I policy aims at placing S&T at the service of social 
inclusion. To this end, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT) created the Science 
and Technology Secretariat for Social Inclusion (SECIS) in 2003.28 So far, SECIS has 
promoted activities to publicize and disseminate social technologies,29 improve science 
teaching in the schools and popularize scientific knowledge.30 Nonetheless, since the 
                                                 
28 Interestingly, the MCT has only four secretariats, of which this is one. The other three are dedicated, 
respectively, to informatics (reflecting the importance of the IT policy theme in the recent past), to R&D, and 
to technology and innovation. 
29 Actually, the concept of social technology is still under construction. Dagnino, Brandão and Novaes (2005) 
present an analysis of the conceptual framework on which the notion rests. The Brazilian Social Technology 
Network (RTS) adopts the following definition: “Social Technology involves replicable products, techniques 
and methods developed through interaction with the community and characterized by their ability to provide 
effective solutions for social transformation” (http://www.rts.org.br/tecnologia-social).  
30 Among the most successful activities along these lines have been the annual math Olympics and other 
initiatives aimed at strengthening the learning of mathematics at the secondary level. The 2008 Olympics are 




solutions to the social problems of Brazil probably depend far more on factors other than 
the generation and dissemination of scientific knowledge, this line of policy has come 
under criticism from those who do not see social inclusion as being within the sphere of 
ST&I policy. Although the scope and efficacy of such instruments can also be questioned, 
this line of policy had the merit of effectively introducing the issue of ST&I contribution 
for aggravating or alleviating the social conditions of the greater part of the Brazilian 
populace into the Brazilian policy agenda. 
 
While not always observing a precise understanding of the concept of Local Productive 
Arrangements (APLs, in its Portuguese acronym), the approach linked to this relatively new 
concept has proven to be an extremely useful tool for analyzing and guiding interventions 
focused on technological change and innovation. One of the most important aspects of this 
approach is its emphasis on cooperation and networking among suppliers, producers, 
service providers, enterprise and labor associations, local governments, universities and 
other public and private institutions. A great number of federal, state and municipal 
programs and agencies, as well as trade and industry associations, are currently working 
with APLs.31 Assuming that the abuses practiced in their name do not undermine the 
potential of the APLs, they may well consolidate as an effective means of strengthening 
practices capable of leading to a policy paradigm no longer based on the Linear Model, but 
rather on a systemic approach. Such a paradigm would allow for the collective inclusion of 
micro, small and medium enterprises in technological and innovative efforts, a step 
unquestionably representing an advance given the historical difficulty of dealing with this 
segment via programs that sought to reach it on a firm-by-firm basis. It would also serve to 
overcome the general notion that issues connected to ST&I are only of interest to a small 
elite composed of scientists, researchers, university professors and, ultimately, of large 
enterprises endowed with state-of-the-art technologies.32 
 
In sum, the traditional approaches to S&T policy – support to R&D and the formation of 
professionals with Master’s and doctoral degrees (both of which reflect the linear supply 
model) – have continued to advance in a pattern similar to that of the former development 
phase. They have come to be accompanied, however, by an expressive set of new measures 
and trends, each of which in one way or another diverges from the policies typical of the 
paradigm inspired by the Linear Model. 
 
The Sectoral Funds, the Law of Innovation and the “Good Law”, as well as the formulation 
of a policy that is simultaneously industrial and technological (PITCE) – all indicate that 
Brazilian S&T policy is shifting towards the enterprise and the productive sector. Similarly, 
the discovery of ST&I policy as a potential tool for the regional and local development of 
states and municipalities, together with the recognition of the utility of the APL approach as 
an instrument for organizing local systems for production and innovation, confirm the 
notion that innovation is assuming a more important role in policies directed to the 
                                                                                                                                                    
expected to involve more than 18 million students and over 4 thousand schools representing nearly all the 
municipalities in the country (http://www.obm.or.br and http://222.obmep.org.br).  
31 A Google search using the term “Arranjos Produtivos Locais” (in Portuguese and between quotation marks) 
identified approximately 120 thousand pages on the subject on the Internet. 
32  Regarding APLs, see, for  example, “Seminário Dez Anos de Arranjos e Sistemas Produtivos e Inovativos 
Locais” at http://www.redesist.ie.ufrj.br/redesist10/. 




scientific and technological development of the country, in accordance with the concept of 
a National Innovation System, or so-called Systemic Model. 
 
Hence, there are indications that S&T policy, in this third postwar phase of Brazilian 
development, is moving in the direction of technological innovation. Assuming this to be 
the case, two questions arise: 1) Is Brazil effective shifting from an essentially linear, 
supply-side S&T policy to a true systemic, innovation-based policy? 2) Will the country 
have the opportunity to enter another development phase in which the growth of income 
and the quality of life of the population comes to depend, above all, on innovation and 
technological capabilities, as in the developed economies?33 
 
 
3. Challenges to the building of an effective innovation policy 
 
An effective innovation policy is prerequisite to building the foundations of Brazilian 
development. 
 
In the closing years of the 20th century and the opening years of the 21st, there were 
significant advances towards creating an environment favorable to mounting an innovation 
policy in Brazil. These advances involved not only ideas, but instruments and structural 
conditions. In the sphere of ideas, doctrines and scientific theory, neoliberal thought — 
which had condemned developing countries to resigning themselves to destinies determined 
by the market and to abdicating the right to invest in their project of future by implementing 
active policies — lost steam. The comprehension of the fact that technical change lies at the 
core of any true development process became more widespread because of the gradual 
introduction of this variable within conventional economics, which was originally took as a 
variable exogenous to its theoretical core. Meanwhile, evolutionary or neo-Schumpeterian 
theories advanced significantly the understanding of the phenomenon of technological 
innovation and contributed to formulating the reference framework for the conception of 
modern ST&I policies with the development of the National Innovation Systems approach. 
 
With regard to instruments, as seen in the preceding section, a set of diversified and 
important policy measures were explicitly adopted with the goal of stimulating innovation 
in the country. In the evaluation of some analysts, the mounting of the innovation policy 
apparatus has essentially been concluded. This appears, for example, to be the opinion of 
Arruda, Vermulm and Hollanda (2006, p. 106), when they affirm that: 
 
There is no doubt that, in recent years and inspired by international experience, the 
country has advanced considerably toward creating an institutional apparatus 
better suited to stimulating innovation. When the instruments existing in Brazil are 
compared to those in more developed countries, nothing appears to be lacking, 
despite there still being gaps and a need to improve certain aspects of the legal 
framework. We now have access to a broad range of new instruments designed 
                                                 
33 See Viotti (2004) for an explanation of why development depends on authentic competitiveness (based on 
technological gains), while underdevelopment reflects spurious competitiveness (based on protectionism, 
cheap labor and predatory exploitation of natural resources).  




according to international best practices, as well as to a significant volume of 
resources for supporting the R&D and innovation projects of enterprises in various 
ways and in diverse stages. 
 
Even so, these same authors recognize that it is extremely hard to put the new instruments 
into operation (Arruda, Vermulm and Hollanda 2006, p. 107-12). 
 
It is admittedly not an easy task to substitute the conviction, prevalent for decades, that 
research, and especially basic research, is the key, the very catalyst, of technological 
development. Consequently, as recent ST&I policy has demonstrated, it is easier to 
formulate goals, justifications and programs inspired by the systemic approach than to 
execute them while leaving aside the traditional practices inspired by the Linear Model; for, 
in the end, the latter influence or dominate the implementation of the former. 
 
Unfortunately, since the Linear Model has been neither replaced nor entirely displaced, it 
continues to exert strong influence, particularly among scientists and scholars.34 Given the 
force of inertia, R&D objectives supposedly inspired by the Systemic Model are ultimately 
implemented through means associated with the Linear Model.35 For example, a relatively 
small proportion of the resources applied by the Sectoral Funds is directed to supporting the 
innovation efforts of enterprises.36 All too often, the selection processes for support 
                                                 
34 It should be stressed that the WTO regulations also contribute to this. The Organization’s 
general prohibition of subsidies and other forms of protection significantly diminishes the 
extent to which policies can actively support enterprises. At the same time, its excepting 
subsidies for R&D, but not for other types of innovation activities, clearly reinforces the 
adoption of policy measures aligned with the Linear Model. 
35 In practice, the difficulties involved in consolidating policies based on the systemic 
approach are not a Brazilian problem alone. Despite the differences, a similar problem 
exists in Europe. Arundel and Hollanders (2006, p. 2) point out that though reference is no 
longer made to the science-push or linear model based on R&D, close analysis of the main 
policy documents indicates that “the concept of innovation in use is primarily R&D.” 
Moreover, “the main innovation policy instruments in all European countries either 
subsidize R&D or are linked to R&D” (Arundel and Hollanders 2006, p. 3). In 
confirmation of this assessment, Arundel (2006, p. 4) estimates that, in Europe, “programs 
that do not involve R&D probably account for less than 5% of all government support for 
innovation.” An OECD (2005, p. 7) report comes to a similar conclusion: “The innovation 
policy of the OECD countries has been seen as an extension of R&D policy. As such it has 
been linked to research and technological development. This remains to be the case, even 
though the systemic approach developed under the label of ‘National Innovation Systems’ 
(NIS) during the 1990’s expanded this perspective to include interactive linkages in the 
innovation system.” 
36 Though somewhat dated, this is the conclusion of the known evaluations of the Sectoral 
Funds (IEDI 2005 and Pereira 2005). IEDI (2005), for example, states that the “funds were 
mainly allocated to renewal of the public research infrastructure and academic research, 
with no clear connection to sectoral or national priorities, or to the formation of human 
resources, thus complementing CAPES and CNPq. A considerable portion of the funds was 
also directed to activities such as planning, studies and structuring of research networks.” 




theoretically intended to promote firm-level innovation simply adopt criteria better suited to 
academic proposals owing to the evaluators already being acquainted with the procedures. 
 
The difficulty of assimilating the Systemic Model is expressed by Pacheco (2005, p. 20) as 
follows:  
 
The players have little understanding of the systemic nature of these public policies 
or of the complementary nature of the investments required. Curiously, an academic 
bias can be observed not only in the demand for resources and requests for support 
of universities and post-graduate studies, but also in the suggestions for policies in 
support of the private sector. In Brazil, proposals, including those in support of 
industry, are often formulated from the perspective of academic research: financing 
for activities with no immediate returns, grants for investment in human resources, 
and holding the public sector responsible for promoting private sector research 
activities. [In contrast], little advance has been made in relation to placing typically 
economic or industrial policies on the agenda, such as offering new credit lines and 
supporting  firms in their efforts to internationalize, acquire certification, or 
improve their products and/or processes. 
  
Beyond what Pacheco terms “academic bias”, other obstacles exist to the implementation 
of innovation policy due to the fact that its nature differs from that of the previous policy, 
as do its primary agents and proposals. Whereas traditional S&T policies involve mainly 
public universities and research institutes, innovation policies center on enterprises; and 
different from learning and research institutions, whose main objectives are to form human 
resources and produce scientific articles, enterprises produce and commercialize goods and 
services in order to earn profit. Whether owing to this difference in nature or to long 
institutional practice, it is easy for public agencies to deal with, support and stimulate 
learning and research institutions, but extremely hard for them to interact with enterprises 
in a similar manner. This difficultly has marked the efforts to implement policy instruments 
specifically aimed at promoting innovation, such as offering subsidies or requisitioning 
innovative products and processes. 
 
The problems involved in implementing innovation policy became highly evident during 
the 2006 Innovation and Jurisprudence Seminar sponsored by the Industrial Federation of 
the State of São Paulo (FIESP) and the Center for Strategic Management and Studies 
(CGEE). During the seminar, the problems faced by both policy administrators and 
corporate managers were discussed (CGEE 2007). All feel the lack of a regulatory net 
enabling them to safely take advantage of the opportunities offered by the new innovation 
policy. Given that certain clauses of the existing legislation are quite restrictive, those 
responsible for implementing the policies face the risk of legal exposure. By way of 
example, government purchases are rigorously subject to the lowest price law, thus making 
it nearly impossible to use the purchasing power of the government as a tool to stimulate 
innovation. In this case, recommending that the government purchase an item — even one 
authorized under the new Law of Innovation — might attract the attention of an inspection 
agency and lead to cancellation of the purchase or even condemnation of those who 
requisitioned it. Another example refers to the legal limits of the new fiscal incentive 




legislation, since from the legal standpoint, a consensus has not yet been reached as to 
which types of R&D and innovation activities have the right to incentives. 
 
Suzigan and Furtado’s (2006) evaluation of the industrial, technological and trade policy 
(PITCE) implemented during the period 2003-2006 was harshly critical:  
 
Although [PITCE] has certain positive aspects, such as its focus on innovation, 
clearly defined goals and new institutional organization, it fails as a development 
policy due to weaknesses such as its lack of compatibility with macroeconomic 
policy, lack of consistency among its policy instruments, weaknesses in the 
infrastructure and overall system for science, technology and innovation, lack of 
coordination and lack of political will. (Suzigan and Furtado 2006, p. 163) 
 
In spite of believing that the majority of instruments necessary to the innovation policy 
have already been created (as already indicated), Arruda, Vermulm and Hollanda (2006, p. 
109) are also highly critical as to the management of the policy: 
 
What has been observed to date is a great lack of organization in relation to the 
execution of policy measures in the area of science, technology and innovation. The 
financial resources available are far from sufficient and allocated in an unplanned, 
pulverized way, thus making it impossible to achieve the structural change 
necessary. On the one hand, the private sector lacks the technological capabilities 
required to transform [Brazil] into a more dynamic industrial economy on the basis 
of innovation; on the other, if this is to happen, the public sector will have to 
participate in a proper and more competent manner. 
 
Awareness of these obstacles to the effective implementation of the innovation policy leads 
to the conclusion that much is yet to be done for the policy to bear significant fruit. 
Overcoming the limitations imposed by these obstacles will unquestionably require much 
time and energy. 
 
The great number of measures, initiatives and guidelines that currently exist need to 
converge to a more reduced and manageable set of strategic priorities and goals, and 
simultaneously it is also necessary to recover the country’s capability for planning and 
coordinating long term actions and policies. 
 
In addition, the lack of coordination and synergy among the various institutions in charge 
of carrying out innovation policies also compromise their efficacy. The need for 
coordination applies not only to the institutions typically linked to innovation, but also to 
other institutions, as well as to other governmental spheres and their extensions. In this 
regard, it is worth calling attention to the fact that there is little need for coordination when 
a policy is focused exclusively on research (especially basic research) or on the formation 
of human resources, since these two areas are subject to vertical relations with typical S&T 
institutions. In the case of true innovation policy, however, the situation is considerably 
different, given that the innovations are in areas not typical of traditional S&T policy, such 
as agriculture, industry, defense, health and telecommunications. Hypothetically, for 
example, it is of little use to develop a technology in the field of telecommunications if its 




utilization is neither permitted nor validated by  the sector regulation. At the same time, the 
success of many innovations depends on measures or decisions relating to government 
purchases, taxes, financing, tariffs, sanitary controls, biological safety or environmental 
controls, none of which are within the sphere of S&T. For this reason, the need for 
coordination becomes absolutely essential when the question is one of transition from 
traditional S&T policies to innovation policies. 
 
While the definition of a reduced set of strategic objectives facilitates coordination, it will 
also be necessary to restructure and qualify the institutional apparatus in order to improve 
its ability to deal with the very process of priority setting, exercising coordination, 
evaluation and executing plans and policies. Within this perspective, some institutions were 
created, one being the Brazilian Agency for Industrial Development (ABDI). As a rule, 
however, these institutions have proven fragile and ill-prepared for the demands placed on 
them. Consequently, they need to be strengthened and/or restructured. The restructuring 
and qualification of the National Industrial Property Institute (INPI) currently underway is a 
step in the right direction. However, other institutions such as the very Ministry of Science 
and Technology (MCT), its Financing Agency for Studies and Projects (FINEP), the 
National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq)  still have much to 
do in order to become adapt and qualified for the effective implementation of a innovation 
policy. 
 
It must be recognized, however, that, a priori, no institutions, instruments or even policies 
are ideal for the promotion of innovation. Nor are there international models that can be 
copied in their entirety, for the model should be constructed in accordance with the 
historical conditions and the strategic needs of the country in question. What international 
experience does reveal, however, is that successful models reflect a continuous effort to 
adapt, learn from and improve the policies involved; in other words, they have built-in 
mechanisms for “policy learning” (OECD 2005). In fact, at the present stage of Brazilian 
ST&I policy, any advance in the direction of “a policy that learns” would be most 
opportune, the reason being that the it is currently marked by a certain degree of 
experimentalism where numerous approaches, programs, plans, policies, instruments and 
measures are being tested, but they are not always interconnected nor do they always reflect 
the priority that the new policy ascribes to innovation.37 
 
One of the factors that makes a policy intelligent and enables it to learn from experience is 
the existence of an evaluation system. In this respect, much remains to be done in Brazil. 
Among the systems in operation in the country, that which provides feedback to CAPES 
stands out for its capacity to guide higher learning and research and inform the general 
public. However, most of the existing monitoring systems are overly focused on evaluating 
individual projects a priori, an activity which is evidently of limited value in terms of 
bettering policies. For this purpose, it is essential to improve the assessment of policies, 
plans, programs, tools and measures in general. Moreover, such assessments must be 
                                                 
37 This is evident from the “menu” of possibilities offered on the Internet by federal 
ministries, state secretariats, regulatory agencies, financing agencies and other entities 
directly or indirectly involved in ST&I. 




conceived and employed with a view to reformulating and improving policies, without 
being allowed to become an end in themselves. 
 
The ongoing efficacy of an innovation policy depends, however, on far more than 
modifying and improving the regulations, management and institutional framework of the 
policy. The seeds of innovation must be planted on fertile ground; and for this to occur, the 
learning and research institutes, and, above all, the enterprises involved, must be adequately 
prepared. 
 
Achieving the desired transformation of learning and research institutions goes beyond 
relaxing the regulations that guide them and setting up technology transfer centers for 
intellectual property protection and commercialization, as prescribed by the Law of 
Innovation. It is also of vital importance to modernize graduate and postgraduate courses by 
updating their curricula in such a way as to prepare their students also to engage in 
technological innovation.38 Even at the postgraduate level, which has excellent credentials 
in terms of growth, diversification and quality, more has to be done to meet the demands of 
a market that should be less concentrated in the universities themselves, research institutes 
and public administration.39 In other words, technological change and innovation, both 
current and projected, should play a more important role in determining the development of 
Brazilian postgraduate programs. 
 
At the same time, Brazilian enterprises generally have little familiarity with innovation;40 
and when they have passive technological strategies or lack the capacity for active 
technological learning and innovation, as is the case of the majority of Brazilian industrial 
enterprises,41 the efficacy as well as the efficiency of the stimuli offered by innovation 
policies is evidently compromised, not to mention the ability of the enterprises to help 
                                                 
38 There are indications that Brazilian PhDs are directly contributing far less than possible 
to firm-level innovation. The Brazilian Innovation Survey (PINTEC) estimated, for 
example, that less than 3 thousand workers with postgraduate degrees were engaged in 
R&D activities at innovative firms in 2000, a year in which Brazilian universities conferred 
18 thousand Master’s and 5 thousand doctoral degrees (Viotti et al. 2005). Regarding this 
subject, also see Viotti and Baessa (2008). 
39 According to Viotti and Baessa (2008), of the almost 26 thousand Brazilians who 
received doctoral degrees in the period 1996-2003 and were formally employed during 
2004, 65.96% were working in the educational sector, 18.27% in public administration, 
defense or social security, and only 1.24% in industrial manufacture. 
40 Viotti (2205 and 2007) offers a relative idea of how limited innovation is in Brazil by 
comparing the innovative performance of Brazilian industrial enterprises to that of 
Argentine and European enterprises. The comparison is based on data from the Brazilian 
innovation survey (PINTEC 2000) and the third round of the surveys conducted by the 
European Community (CIS-3). 
41 The concepts of passive and active technological learning, as differentiated from 
innovation, were introduced by Viotti (1997 and 2002) and further elaborated in a 
subsequent work (Viotti 2004). Empirical data indicating that the passive technological 
learning strategy prevails among Brazilian industrial enterprises are to be found in Viotti 
(2005 and 2007).  




shape the very policies that affect them. This limitation is mainly due to the history of 
Brazilian industry, the structure of the enterprises and the macroeconomic environment in 
which they operated or operate. Factors linked to the structure of the productive sector also 
condition or limit the innovation process of the country as a whole. For instance, there are 
relatively few Brazilian enterprises in the more technologically dynamic sectors, which 
tend to be led by foreign enterprises,42 and few Brazilian undertakings are competitive in 
global markets. Thus, policies, business strategies and the domestic enterprises themselves 
all need to be redirected towards restructuring the productive sector so as to make it more 
favorable for innovation. 
 
Undoubtedly, the macroeconomic environment is among the factors that most strongly 
influence the productive structure and the propensity to innovate. Although changing this 
environment is a task of historic proportions, it is one that the country must undertake. 
During the import substitution period, the industrial sector was essentially committed to 
absorbing productive capacity, which is associated with passive technological learning. 
Thereafter – during the last two decades of the 20th century and the first years of the 21st 
century – the macroeconomic environment was hostile to investment, and especially to the 
type of investment that involved risk or was of a long-term nature, such as investment in 
innovation. 
 
Fortunately, however, the last few years have been ones of significant progress in the 
Brazilian macroeconomic scenario. Among the advances witnessed are the substantial 
reductions in the external vulnerability of the economy, in the volatility of prices, in the 
near chronic instability of the economy and in the resulting lack of predictable horizons, all 
of which formerly led to a short-term outlook and defensive strategies, which, in turn, 
discouraged investment. 
 
Even so, the investments so vital to innovation are still extremely limited. The historic 
dimension of the challenge represented by the need to recover the overall investment levels 
of the economy becomes clearly visible on analyzing the evolution of the rates of 
investment in Brazil. The average rate of investment stood at 21.6% of GDP in the 1970s; 
22.2% in the 1980s; fell to 18.2% in the 1990s; and then dropped to a mere 16.4% in the 
period 2000-2007. It was still very low during 2007 when it achieved 17.6%,43 but it is 
relevant to note that the growth of investment has been sustained during the last three years. 
These level of investment seem to be incompatible with any strong process of development 
and this fact becomes obvious when they are compared with those of economies on the 
catching-up path, such as China, where the rates over the last several years have 
approached 40% of GDP. For the rates of investment to rise and the economy to grow at a 
                                                 
42 Viotti and Baessa (2007, p. 223) have found indications that the foreign enterprises in 
Brazil are less innovative in technologically advanced sectors (which they dominate) than 
in more traditional sectors. In turn, Araújo (2005) has found evidence that firm size, 
sectoral distribution, etc., having been controlled for, the foreign enterprises in Brazil invest 
significantly smaller proportions of their turnover in R&D than do the domestic enterprises. 
43 These data were computed from information presented in the table “Taxa de 
Investimentos a Preços Correntes – % do PIB”, updated on 12 March 2008 
(http://www.ipeadata.gov.br). 




faster pace, hence allowing for more vigorous innovation efforts, the current interest rates, 
as well as the now overvalued exchange rate, will have to be substantially lowered. 
 
In spite of the magnitude of the task of framing a macroeconomic environment capable of 
stimulating innovation, the structural conditions are now incomparably more favorable than 
they were in recent decades. The stability of the economy and the democratic process have 
apparently been consolidated. As a result of this stability and recent social policies, the 
domestic market is in frank expansion. The current energy crisis is not likely to have the 
shattering impact on the growth of the country that former crises had; on the contrary, 
Brazil appears to be in a position to benefit from the crisis due to promising opportunities 
for its ethanol and oil output. The country is now in the technological lead in relation to the 
production and use of ethanol for fuel-combustion engines, an application which helps 
reduce the emission of gases that contribute to the greenhouse effect. In addition, the 
country has become self-sufficient in oil and has recently discovered new superfields. 
Lastly, Brazil is in an excellent position to benefit from the rapid growth of the world 
demand for food, as well as from the spiraling prices for food and mineral products. 
 
This alignment of the stars in the world economy in favor of Brazil clearly represents a 
window of opportunity for the framing of a successful development policy. The greatest 
challenge facing the country is not to become complacent in the face of the passing 
bonanza, but to take advantage of this historic opportunity to implement a set of active 
policies to anchor the growth and development of the country on competitive advantages 
based on technological advantages rather than on the unsustainable exploitation of natural 
resources and cheap labor. In other words, the greatest challenge facing Brazil is to 
transform S&T policy into an effective innovation policy and convert it in the basis for the  
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